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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we compile a unique historical dataset that records strike activity in the 
British engineering industry from 1920 to 1970. These data have the advantage of 
containing a fairly homogenous set of companies and workers, covering a long period 
with varying labour market conditions, including information that enables the addition of 
union and company fixed effects, and providing geographical detail that allows a district-
level analysis that controls for year and seasonal effects. We study the cyclicality of strike 
durations, strike incidence, and strike outcomes and distinguish between pay and non-pay 
strikes. Like the previous literature, we find evidence that strikes over pay have 
countercyclical durations. However, in the post-war period, the magnitude of this effect is 
much reduced when union and firm fixed effects are included. These findings suggest 
that it is important when studying strike durations to take account of differences in the 
composition of companies and unions that are involved in strikes at different points of the 
business cycle. We also find that strike outcomes tend to be more favourable to unions 
when the national unemployment rate is lower. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economists have long been interested in how strike duration and strike incidence 
change with labour market conditions. Evidence from the U.S. (Kennan 1985) and 
Canada (Harrison and Stewart 1989) suggests that strike durations are countercyclical.    
The North American evidence lends more qualified support to the view that strike 
incidence is procyclical (Kennan, 1986; Harrison and Stewart, 1994).  However, the 
findings are by no means uniform across the strikes’ literature.  In this paper, we use a 
new data set that we have put together from the strikes records of the Engineering 
Employers Federation (EEF) in Great Britain. Statistics cover 10,870 company-level 
strike incidents over the period 1920 to 1970.  These unique data allow us to study strike 
durations in a relatively homogenous industry and so differ from the cross-industry 
studies that dominate earlier research work.1 
 Our data add to earlier studies in several other ways. First, they cover a long 
period that straddles two colossal events, the Great Depression and the Second World 
War (WW2). As such, there is tremendous variation in cyclical conditions over the 
sample period. Second, they allow use of other comparable data collected for this period, 
especially district-level unemployment rates. These rates, matched to districts in which 
strikes took place, enable us to exploit cross-sectional variation in labour market 
conditions in addition to time-series variation. Third, we make use of company and union 
identifiers to investigate the robustness of our estimates to the presence of company and 
union fixed effects. Including these extra controls increases the likelihood that we are 
                                 
1 Also, the engineering industry was particularly strike-prone. Durcan et al. (1983) report that 57% of major 
stoppages (defined as involving the loss of 5000 working days or more) in all British industry (excluding 
Mining) between 1946 and 1973 were accounted for by just five industries; these were, in descending 
order, motor vehicles, non-electrical engineering, electrical engineering, iron and steel, and shipbuilding. 
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capturing true cyclical effects rather than selection effects. Finally, we add to the 
literature by examining how labour market conditions impact strike outcomes. In 
particular we examine whether unions are more likely to obtain successful outcomes if 
the unemployment rate is low. 
 
2. Is there a Good Time to Stay Out? 
Would we expect strike activity to link systematically to changes in the 
macroeconomic climate?  The dominant approaches to understanding strikes incidence 
and duration (see, especially, Kennan 1986) appear to give, at best, equivocal answers.   
One view effectively rules out significant correlations between strike 
incidence/duration and the business cycle.  Hicks (1932) holds that strikes occur more or 
less randomly, resulting from irrational bargaining behaviour.  If the company and its 
workforce are fully and symmetrically informed about internal and external product and 
labour markets, then they can rationally achieve an optimal contractual relationship 
without recourse to costly and inefficient disputes and work stoppages.  
For strikes to occur under conditions of full rationality requires an assumption of 
private information, the principal motivation behind the dominant approach to explaining 
strike activity.  In a company-union context, for example, strikes can be seen as a means 
of one (or both) party’s willingness to incur costs in order to elicit more information from 
the other side of the dispute. Generally, the assumption is that the company has private 
information about profitability and the union about its members’ appetite and capacity for 
strike action. In screening models, the union makes take-it-or-leave-it wage offers to the 
company and strikes if an offer is rejected. The company balances the cost of a strike of a 
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given expected length followed by settlement at a low wage against the cost of accepting 
the union’s initial high wage offer and not facing a strike. Signalling models have the 
opposite structure in that the informed party, the company, makes the wage offers. There 
are also models in the literature that allow for private information on both sides and/or 
both screening and signalling elements (Kennan and Wilson 1993, Cramton and Tracy 
2003).  However, it is difficult to envisage product and labour market conditions playing 
a prominent role in models that stress the motivating role of variables that are 
asymmetrically understood by the parties.2   
 In the literature, there is limited evidence of procyclical strike incidence and 
somewhat broader support for countercyclical strike duration.  These are plausible 
outcomes from a union perspective.  When sales are high and inventories are low and 
when productive workers are faced with abundant job opportunities, the company may 
perceive particularly high costs of work stoppages.  This would seem to provide a good 
time for the union to solve a grievance through strike action since there is pressure on the 
company to expedite matters.  When unemployment is high, the union may perceive high 
costs to strike action (Farber, 1978).  Alternative sources of employment income for 
strikers (part-time jobs, the black economy) will be relatively scarce and the situation 
may be exacerbated if wider family members are also experiencing adverse job 
conditions.  Moreover, when strikes do occur during economic downturns, high 
                                 
2 Booth and Cressy (1990) establish a possible connection between private information regarding company 
profit and the business cycle. Companies with high capacity utilisation, ceteris paribus, may be perceived 
to enjoy high profits and so be more strike-prone.  This line of reasoning suggests procyclical strike 
incidence.  In their regression analysis, however, the two measures used by these authors to proxy 
utilisation (rising/stable sales and establishments operating at full capacity) produce contradictory results.   
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inventories and thin order books may provide conditions in which employers can afford 
to be more robust in their resolve, resisting demands for relatively protracted periods.3  
Kennan (1986) and Cramton and Tracy (2003) argue that it is a challenge for 
bargaining models to underpin theoretically findings of procyclical incidence and 
countercyclical duration. But, there is considerable room to be cautious over treating 
these outcomes as if they represented a consensus among researchers.  Strong counter 
evidence exists.  Analysing 6,000 negotiations in British manufacturing in the 1980s, 
Ingram et al. (1993) find significant countercyclical strike incidence.  Based on a U.S. 
data set covering over 6,000 union contracts for the period 1970 to 1981, McConnell 
(1990) finds no evidence of cyclical variation in strike duration. 
 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Analysis 
The strike records we use come from a set of volumes on engineering strikes 
within the Engineering Employers' Federation (EEF)4 that are stored at the University of 
Warwick’s Modern Records Centre. These provide company-level annual strike 
information for all the Federation’s members over an unbroken period from 1920 to 
1970.  The data are very comprehensive: for each strike, they report the name of the 
company involved, the union(s) involved, the geographical engineering district (e.g. 
                                 
3 There is an obvious counter argument (Vanderkamp, 1970). If product market demand is generally weak 
then employers may be wary of jeopardising their relationship with existing customers given a relative 
abundance of alternative supply sources. 
 
4 The Employers' Federation of Engineering Associations was established in 1896 and by 1899 had become 
known as the Engineering Employers' Federation. It later merged in 1918 with the National Employers' 
Federation and become known as the Engineering and Allied Employers' National Federation. In 1961 it 
changed its name back to the Engineering Employers' Federation (EEF). The EEF is the largest sector 
employers' organisation in the United Kingdom with a current membership of nearly 6000 companies 
throughout the country. 
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Coventry), the cause of the strike, the outcome or resolution, the strike duration in days5 
(with precise start and end dates), the numbers involved (by men, women and boys), the 
classes of workers involved (e.g. toolroom fitters, machinemen), and numbers of workers 
incidentally laid off as a result of the strike. The level of detail is consistent for each and 
every year over the half century covered. We have transcribed these data on to 
spreadsheets in a systematic fashion so that they are useful for statistical analysis. There 
are no censored durations because all reported strikes had ended at the end of the data. 
By far the highest strike incidence in our data occurred during the 1960s (see 
Figure 2b and Table 3 below).  We are able to undertake an especially detailed 
investigation of this important strikes period as monthly district-level unemployment 
rates are available for the period 1960-1970 for 54 engineering districts. (Districts are 
listed in Appendix Table 1). We match these exactly to the start month of the strike and 
to the EEF district in which each strike occurred.  
Because we are using a new dataset, we now describe some of the characteristics 
of the included strikes and describe how these relate to information in the literature from 
other sources. 
 
Determinants of Working Days Lost 
The number of working days lost as a result of strikes depends on three factors – 
the number of strikes, the average strike duration, and the average number of workers per 
strike. Following Forchheimer (1948) and Knowles (1952), Figure 1 shows the annual  
decomposition of total days lost due to EEF strikes sub-divided into these three factors.  
                                 
5 For strikes lasting less than a day, durations are reported in hours. 
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Let DAYSLOST = total working days lost (per-period), STRIKES = number of strikes, 
MEANDUR = average strike duration, and MEANW = average number of workers 
involved in strikes; then ln(DAYSLOST) = ln(STRIKES) + ln(MEANDUR) + 
ln(MEANW).  The latter expression is graphed in Figure 1. It is clear that all three 
components play an important role in determining the total number of working days lost.  
Note the large fall in the number of strikes in the mid 1920s to early 1930s.   This is not 
special to our EEF data but is true in general for engineering and related metal industries, 
as illustrated in Appendix Table 2. 
 
Numbers of Strikes 
Figures 2a and 2b show the annual number of strikes taking place within the EEF 
from 1920 to 1970. They also show the number of strikes within British Industry as a 
whole. Clearly, EEF and national patterns match closely.  Figure 2a covers the period 
from 1920 to the end of WW2.  The two marked features are (a) the relatively low level 
of strike activity between 1922 and 1934 and (b) a growth in the number of strikes in the 
run up to and during WW2.  For the first of these sub-periods, Knowles (1952, p.145-
150) finds little evidence of national level relationships between the number of strikes on 
the one hand and the cost of living, weekly wage rates and union membership on the 
other. Low levels of strikes do tend to correspond more closely with high national 
unemployment rates, but even these associations are not altogether very persuasive.6   In 
the second sub-period, there were large numbers of official and unofficial engineering 
                                 
6 For example, unemployment rates peaked in 1931 and 1932, at the height of the Great Depression, with 
about one-quarter of the workforce unemployment on average in EEF engineering districts (Hart and 
MacKay, 1975).   But strike activity was at its lowest in 1927 when, at 10%, unemployment was well 
below its peak. 
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strikes resulting, in particular, from pressures of war demands on the industry.  A very 
noticeable feature of Figure 2b, covering post-war strike numbers, is that strike activity 
increases considerably during the 1960s. This is in line with other sources that have 
demonstrated an upsurge in strikes at this time. Galambos and Evans (1977) show that, 
during the period 1965 – 1970, “the Vehicles, Aircraft, Metal Manufacture and 
Engineering groups, already isolated as ‘strike prone’, continue to deteriorate during this 
period”. Between 1965 and 1970, these authors show that between 20 and 25 percent of 
all U.K. industrial disputes (excluding Mining) occurred in engineering and electrical 
goods.   
 
Pay Versus Non-Pay Strikes 
The data include reported reasons for striking and, in common with a number of 
papers in the literature, we have used these to classify strikes as pay-related or non-pay-
related.  Respective issues and frequencies are shown in Tables 1a and 1b, in terms of the 
whole period as well as pre-war and post-war years.7  For all three periods in Table 1a, 
the predominant pay disputes involved wages, bonuses and piece rates.8  Non-pay strikes 
occur for many different reasons, although disputes involving perceived wrongful 
dismissal and union-related grievances are clearly generally important.9  
                                 
7 The complete data set, published in the UK Data Archive (see Acknowledgements for full reference), 
contains more detail about the reason behind each strike. 
 
8 Knowles and Hill (1954) provide an excellent discussion of these payment methods within the context of 
the EEF payroll data. 
 
9 Galambos and Evans (1977) show that in Metals and Engineering Industries the two main reasons for 
non-pay stoppages from 1965 to 1969 were (a) disputes concerning the employment and discharge of 
workers (between 9 and 22 percent of all stoppages during this period), and (b) other working 
arrangements, rules and discipline (between 5 and 16 percent).  The first of these matches ‘wrongful 
dismissal’, the most important cause of non-wage disputes in our data (see Table 1b).  The second, almost 
certainly is included in ‘treatment of workers’, the third in importance. 
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Figure 4 plots the proportion of non-pay to total strikes from 1920 to 1970. To the 
extent that we can verify, this is quite strongly representative of the reported incidence of 
non-pay disputes in other sources. For the period 1965 – 1970, Galambos and Evans 
(1977) report proportions of non-pay strikes of (respectively) 49.7, 44.4, 51.3, 21.0, 37.1 
and 27.6 for the Metals and Engineering industries. For the period 1945 – 1957, 
McCarthy (1977) shows that 54.8% of all U.K. strikes involved non-pay issues. For all 
British industry over the entire period 1946 to 1973, Durcan et al. (1983) show that non-
pay strikes constituted about 51% of all strikes.  
 
Strike Duration 
Table 2 presents information on strike durations by pay and non-pay issues. It 
shows that durations are longer for strikes in which pay is a factor. Also, strikes tend to 
last longer in northern districts (North of England and Scotland) presumably reflecting 
greater militancy among workers and their unions in the older, more traditional 
engineering areas. Durations in general were considerably longer in the pre-war 
compared to the post-war era.  Wartime strike durations were lowest, with much 
unofficial strike action. 
Table 3 shows the mean, median and survival rates of strike durations (in days) 
for each year in the sample. Figure 5 plots the mean duration data.  It is clear that there is 
wide variation in durations across years with durations being particularly long during the 
first halves of the 1920s and 1930s. These patterns in the data are consistent with other 
sources. Knowles (1952, pp. 152-157) examines British industrial strike durations (all 
industries) during the period 1911 to 1936.  Over this period, 27.1% of striking workers 
were involved in strikes lasting for 10 weeks and over, while 23.3% of strikers took part 
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in strikes lasting for between 4 and 10 weeks.  1926 appears to have been a watershed 
year. Up to that year, 31.5% of strikes lasted for at least 10 weeks, a percentage that fell 
to 20.2% between 1927 and 1936.  Knowles also shows that strikes involving 5000 
workers or more were prevalent during the period 1911 - 1926 (85.5% of all working 
days lost) but far less so between 1927 and 1947 (55.7%). 10 
When mean strike durations are juxtaposed against national unemployment rates, 
as in Figure 5, the contrast between pre- and post-war eras is even more starkly 
illustrated.  Pre-war unemployment is generally on a different scale from post-war 
experience, around the towering peak of the early 1930s Great Depression.  At their 
lowest points – in the late 1920s and middle-to-late 1930s - average pre-war durations are 
comparable to post-war figures.  But in the early-to-mid 1920s and at the height of the 
Depression, mean durations displayed extraordinary increases.  
 
Number of Unions per Strike 
In line with British unionism in general, engineering unions did not represent 
companies but, rather, trades and skills.  Therefore, a given industrial dispute could 
involve more than one union.  Table 4 shows the percentage of total strikes in the 
complete data set covered by one, two (and so on up to ten) unions.  While two-thirds of 
strikes in the data involve a single union, clearly there are significant numbers with two 
or more unions participating. 
 
 
                                 
10 One well known long term engineering strike in which the EEF featured prominently was the 
apprenticeship strike of 1937.  It involved 32,500 apprentices, lasted for 94 days and resulted in 406,000 
working days lost (see Ryan, 2004). 
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4. Strike Incidence and Unemployment Rates 
Strike Incidence 
Given data limitations, we cannot undertake a detailed analysis of the relationship 
between strike incidence and the business cycle. Data are recorded as and when company 
strikes take place and therefore do not report on companies for which no strikes occur.  
However, since we know the total numbers of EEF companies each year from a 
secondary source (Wigham 1973, Appendix J), we can construct a simple annual average 
index of strike incidence: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
t
t
t C
CSTRIKE
cratio ln                    (1) 
where CSTRIKEt is the total number of EEF companies that experienced a strike in year t 
and Ct is the total number of EEF companies in year t.  
Figure 3 shows the (unlogged) graph of this index. The incidence of strikes is 
quite low in the pre-war period (usually less than 2% per year) but rises and exceeds 10% 
in the late 1960s. Unsurprisingly, the patterns in Figure 3 are broadly similar to those of 
the strikes frequencies shown in Figure 2.  
We regress this index on the national annual unemployment rate, Ut, and a 
quadratic time trend for the periods 1920 to 1970, 1920 to 1938 and 1946 to 1970. Thus, 
we have   
                              ttt ttUcratio εαααα ++++= 23210                   (2) 
where cratiot is defined in expression (1) and εt is an error term.  As in all subsequent 
regressions, we split strikes by whether they were primarily about pay or non-pay issues 
(see Tables 1a and 1b for details of the distinctions).  
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The estimates are presented in Table 5.  Consistent with most of the prior 
literature, the evidence suggests that strike incidence is procyclical. Like that literature, 
the results are by no means overwhelmingly supportive.11 Standard errors are relatively 
large and in only one instance – pay disputes over the entire period – do we obtain 
statistical significance.    
 
5. Strike Duration and Unemployment Rates 
In contrast to strike incidence, we can make use of our company-level data to 
study relationships between strike duration and the cycle. We use both national and 
district-level unemployment rates. 
The first specification is a log-linear model of strike duration which we estimate 
over the entire period (1920 – 1970) as well as the pre-war (1920 – 1938) and post-war 
(1946 – 1970) periods using the national rate of unemployment as our measure of the 
cycle.  
 
itittit ttUnionsUduration εβββββ +++++= 243210 )()log(                   (3) 
 
Here, the log duration of strike i in year t is expressed as a function of the national 
unemployment rate in year t (Ut), the number of unions involved in the strike (Unionsit) 12 
                                 
11 Harrison and Stewart (1994) provide one of the best known studies.  Using Canadian data on strikes and 
contracts they find evidence of procyclical strike incidence, particularly in manufacturing industry, but only 
with respect to nonwage issues. 
  
12 There is a potential endogeneity issue with the Unions variable.  As a given strike progresses through 
time, more workers may become affected which in turn may require more unions to become involved.  
Unfortunately, our strike union data does not allow us to observe such sequences.   On the basis of simple 
regressions in which the mean annual average number of unions per strike was regressed on the 
unemployment rate and a quadratic time trend, there is no evidence of cyclicality.   In any event, all 
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and a quadratic in time (measured in years). The quadratic is included to take account of 
secular trends that impact strike duration. Because the national unemployment rate does 
not vary across strikes that occur in the same year, there is a clustering problem that will 
cause OLS variance estimates to understate the true uncertainty about the estimate 
(Moulton 1986).  To counter this problem, we report robust standard errors that allow for 
observations within any year to be correlated.13 
At a far more disaggregate level, the second regression model makes use of 11 
years of monthly unemployment rates (1960 – 1970) for 54 districts (see Appendix Table 
1 for a list of districts).14  For strike i in district d at time t, it takes the form 
 
.
)()log(
54
3210
idt
idtdtidt
DummiesMonthDummiesDistrict
DummiesYearUnionsUduration
εββ
ββββ
+++
+++=
 (4) 
 
Here Udt is the district level unemployment rate at time t (where t is defined in months).15   
There are four potential advantages of the specification in (4) compared to its 
more aggregate equivalent in (3).  First, district-level analysis captures the likelihood that, 
                                                                                                 
subsequent regressions were estimated with and without number of unions per strike as a control variable 
and the estimates of strike duration cyclicality were not impacted by its inclusion or exclusion. 
 
13 We also tried an alternative 2-step estimation procedure, often used in the wage cyclicality literature, to 
overcome the clustering problem (Solon, Barsky and Parker 1994; Devereux 2001). In the present example, 
the first step involves regressing strike duration on number of unions involved in the strike and a set of time 
dummies.  In the second step, the estimated time dummies are regressed on the national unemployment rate 
and the quadratic time trend. The second stage regressions are weighted by the numbers of strikes occurring 
each year.  In the event, the two methods produced very similar results. 
 
14 Unfortunately, we do not have equivalent data for the pre-1960 period. However, the 1960s are an 
especially interesting period to study. From Figures 2a and 2b it is clear that the 1960s marked a period of 
exceptional strike incidence both within the group of EEF companies and British industry as a whole.  In 
fact, it marked the start of an era of union militancy. 
 
15 We cluster the standard errors at the year/month/district level in these regressions. As before, we have 
verified that the analogous 2-step approach gives very similar results for coefficients and standard errors. 
 
 
 13
in many instances, it is local labour market conditions that matter most to unions and 
workers.  Second, introducing cross-sectional variation allows us to include both year 
fixed effects and district fixed effects, while still identifying the effects of the 
unemployment rate. Thus, we can be sure that some unknown year-specific factor that 
impacts strike durations is not confounding our estimates. Third, from Table 2 we note 
that the average strike in the post-war period lasted for about 6 days. In many instances, 
the decision over the best time to stay out may well have been quite finely tuned to the 
perceived state of the cycle within a relatively short interval of time.  This may not be 
captured by a rate of unemployment averaged over a complete year.  Fourth, embracing 
seasonality may well be an important consideration.  In their analysis of the seasonal 
patterns of UK strikes between 1946 and 1973, Durcan et al. (1983) show that spring and 
autumn are the two periods in the year when major stoppages are likely to begin. 
There is a particular value of employing district rates in the post-war period 
because, as shown in Figure 5, during that period the national rate of unemployment goes 
no higher than 2% and so is suggestive of a period of very gentle business cycles.16 
However, there is a great deal of district variation around this aggregate trend. Using our 
1960-1970 monthly unemployment data for 54 districts we regressed the district 
unemployment rate on district, monthly and annual dummies and plotted the residuals.  
Four representative examples – from Scotland, Northern Ireland, the North of England 
(N.E. Coast) and the Midlands (Coventry) - are shown in Figure 6.  Recall from Figure 2b 
that strike activity was especially prevalent at this time as was trade union militancy.  
One of the centres of militancy was in the Midlands, dominated by the automotive 
                                 
16 This is not an issue for the pre-war estimates as there are enormous cyclical variations during that period. 
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industry.  In Figure 6, Coventry represents this region and it is quite clear that this city 
experienced several marked unemployment cycles over these 11 years.  The other 
districts shown – which were not the most volatile of the remaining districts – also 
display systematic movements with high points in late 1962/early 1963 and towards the 
end of the period as well as a fairly pronounced trough in 1966. 
We can classify strikes by both company and by union involvement.  Therefore, 
in regression equations (3) and (4) above, we can add company and union fixed effects in 
the estimating equations.  As we saw in Table 5, strike incidence appears to be 
procyclical, suggesting that, to some limited degree, unions and companies may have 
been more willing to engage in brinkmanship when labour market conditions are good. 
However, it has the further implication that the types of companies and unions that are 
engaged in strikes may differ systematically over the business cycle. This is the rationale 
for inclusion of company and union fixed effects in estimation. With company effects, we 
are essentially comparing strike durations across strikes that occur in the same company 
but at different points in the business cycle. With union effects, we are controlling for the 
aggressiveness of the union. 
There are 1909 different companies in our data set of which 49% experienced 
only 1 strike within the full data coverage.  Of the remainder, 16% percent featured twice, 
8% 3-times, 6% 4-times, 4% 5-times, 3% 6-times, 2% 7-times, and about 1% featured 8-
times or more. At the extreme right of the distribution there are 12 examples of 
companies featuring 100 times or more.  On the union side, our data include 94 different 
single unions involved in strikes while additional strike actions featured 2 or more 
unions.  Where more than one union was involved, the data identify the leading union.  
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Therefore, we decided to code unions from 1 to 94 for single union involvement and then 
95 to 147 where one of these single unions is identified as leading one or more additional 
unions in a given strike.  Appendix Table 3 shows the strike frequency distribution 
pertaining to these 147 distinct union cells.  In 29% of cases there was only one strike 
incident, while 16% involved 2 incidents, 4% 3 incidents and so on. 
The estimates from regression model (3) – that incorporates annual national 
unemployment rates – are shown in Table 6.17   Results for the whole period and for the 
pre-war period reveal only one instance of significant countercyclicality in strike 
durations.  This is obtained in relation to pay-related disputes and after controlling for 
union fixed effects.  Somewhat more comprehensively, pay-related disputes also exhibit 
countercyclical durations in the post-war era.  While the standard errors are large, there is 
an indication that non-pay disputes are also countercyclical during the later period.18   
For the period 1960 to 1970, we repeated the durations regressions using the 
extended specification shown in equation (4). These estimates for the district 
unemployment rate are in Table 7. We present results with year fixed effects in addition 
to estimates with a quadratic in year and we obtain strong evidence that non-pay strike 
durations are countercyclical.  Recall that about 50% of strikes at this time involved non-
                                 
17 We do not report coefficient values for the Unions variable in the table as this variable is likely 
endogenously determined and so subject to bias. However, the coefficient on it is generally negative, 
indicating that strike durations are shorter when more unions are involved. This supports the notion that a 
single union leading a dispute can more efficiently muster the solidarity and cohesion required to ‘stay the 
course’ in order to meet its members’ objectives. However, given the number of unions involved may be 
correlated with many other factors, caution is warranted in interpretation. 
 
18 One concern is that our results may be model-dependent and there are many more sophisticated duration 
models that we could have used. The loglinear model we have used is exactly equivalent to an accelerated 
failure time hazard model in which the error is assumed to be normally distributed. We have experimented 
with many other hazard specifications including weibull, exponential, log-normal, log-logistic, gamma, and 
gompertz and found similar estimates. The derivatives were generally similar to the estimates we report in 
the tables. 
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pay issues (see Figure 4).   Generally, we obtain similar results with respect to OLS and 
union fixed effects regressions.  Interestingly, the addition of company and union fixed 
effects eliminates any evidence that pay-related strike durations are countercyclical.  This 
suggests that there were changes in the composition of unions and firms involved in pay 
strikes over the business cycle and that the inability of  previous studies to include union 
and company fixed effects may have led to bias. 
 
6. Union Strike Success and Unemployment Rates 
In order to improve the probability of gaining from a strike, is it better for the 
union to strike towards the peak of a cycle (when company profit and demand pressures 
are relatively high) while resisting action during troughs (when strikers and their families 
face less favourable alternative labour market options)? The EEF data record the 
outcomes of strikes, although in somewhat less detail than the causes.  The outcomes 
were allocated under the various headings shown in Appendix Table 4.  Some of these 
allocations are, of necessity, somewhat tentative. In other words, it was difficult in some 
instances to decide whether or not a given strike was unequivocally successful or 
unsuccessful.  For the categories labelled ‘successful’, however, it was reasonably clear 
that most strikes achieved a partial gain or a completely successful resolution for the 
union.    
Let OSit be the outcome of strike i at time t such that OSit =1 if a strike is 
‘successful’ (all the OSi’s listed in Table 8) and OSit = 0 otherwise.  We then specify a 
linear probability regression model 
ittit ttUnionsUOS εγγγγγ +++++= 243210 )(   (5) 
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that we estimate by OLS in the same way as in the duration regressions.  As can be seen 
in Table 8, our evidence points to procyclical successful outcomes, both in the pre-war 
and the post-war period. The pre-war finding of procyclicality is robust to company and 
union fixed effects in the case of pay strikes but not for non-pay strikes. In the post-war 
period, the procyclical finding is statistically significant for non-pay strikes when union 
and company fixed effects are included. The magnitude of the effect for pay strikes is 
similar but the standard error is higher so it is not statistically significant. The magnitudes 
are quite big – in the pre-war period a one unit increase in the unemployment rate reduces 
the probability that a pay strike has a successful outcome by .03 (from a baseline of 0.40). 
The equivalent effect of a one point increase in unemployment in the post-war period is 
about .06 for both types of strikes (from a baseline of 0.75).19   
 
7. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we have compiled a unique historical dataset that records strike 
activity in the British engineering industry from 1920 to 1970. A strength of these data is 
that they include a homogenous set of companies and workers, covering a long period 
with varying labour market conditions.   We show that the incidence and causes of strikes 
in engineering over these years follow patterns that are quite reflective of strike behaviour 
in British industry as a whole.  However, unlike earlier broadly based cross-industry 
studies, the engineering data allow us to study the cyclicality of strike durations and 
outcomes after controlling for company, union, time (month and year), and local labour 
market effects.   
                                 
19 We have also carried out this estimation using the 1960-1970 district level unemployment rates sample. 
We found negative estimates that were never statistically significant. 
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We use unemployment rates as our measure of the cycle primarily because they 
allow two levels of aggregation in the regression analyses – i.e. annual national and 
monthly district.  The great advantage of the latter is that the district unemployment rate 
data are matched to coincide with the location and timing of the EEF company strikes.  
We are forced to examine strike incidence at a quite aggregate level and find, in line with 
other studies, fairly weak support for procyclicality. Like the previous literature, we find 
evidence for countercyclical strike durations, both for pay and non-pay related strikes. 
However, in the post-war period, the magnitude of this effect is much reduced for pay 
strikes when union and firm fixed effects are included. These findings suggest that it is 
important when studying strike durations to take account of differences in the 
composition of companies and unions that are involved in strikes at different points of the 
business cycle.  
We also find that strike outcomes tend to be more favourable to unions when the 
national unemployment rate is lower. The evidence for this is particularly strong for pay-
strikes in the pre-war period. This is perhaps unsurprising given the extremely adverse 
economic conditions during the Great Depression years. The evidence on strike success 
rates and the business cycle is weaker post-war but does indicate greater union success 
when the national unemployment rate is lower. 
 19
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Figure 1  Decomposition of total working days lost by strikes, strikers, 
and durations:  EEF, 1920 - 1970
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Figure 1 shows the annual  decomposition of total days lost due to EEF strikes sub-
divided into three factors.  Let DAYSLOST = total working days lost (per-period), 
STRIKES = number of strikes, MEANDUR = average strike duration, and MEANW = 
average number of workers involved in strikes; then ln(DAYSLOST) = ln(STRIKES) + 
ln(MEANDUR) + ln(MEANW).  The latter expression is graphed in Figure 1. 
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Figure 2a Number of strikes in all British Industries and in EEF 
member companies, 1920-1945
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Source: Data for all-industries graph taken from Knowles (1952, Statistical Appendix 
Table 1, p.310). (For 1926, all industries data exclude the General Strike. It lasted from 3-
12 May and, while initiated through an employers’ lock out of coal miners, involved a 
wide cross-section of industry including building, printing, dock, iron, steel, metal, heavy 
chemical, transport and railway workers.)  
 
Figure 2b  Number of strikes in all British industries (excluding 
mining) and in EEF member companies, 1946 - 1970
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Source: Data for all-industries graph from Durcan et al. (1983, Table 6.1, p.174) 
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Figure 3  Strike incidence by companies in the EEF, 1920 - 1970
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Strike incidence is calculated as the total number of EEF companies that experienced a 
strike in year t divided by the total number of EEF companies in year t. 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of non-pay strikes in EEF companies
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Figure 5  Annual average strike durations and the rate of unemployment, 1920 - 1970
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Source of Unemployment Rates: Denham and McDonald (1996) 
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Figure 6 District monthly unemployment net of district, monthly and annual fixed effects: March 1960 to 
December 1970
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This figure is constructed by regressing the district unemployment rate on district, monthly and annual dummies and plotting the 
residuals.
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Table 1a Causes of Pay-Related Strikes, 1920 – 1970 
 
PAY ISSUES 1920-1970 1920-1938 1946-1970 
  Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Wages  49.82 61.94 49.97 
Bonuses 17.09 7.96 17.62 
Piece Rates 14.14 12.19 14.01 
Systems of pay (e.g. rate fixing, abolition of piecework system) 6.78 5.72 5.79 
Payment for Time Lost (mainly waiting time payments due to downtime) 5.07 1.49 5.61 
Relative Pay (mainly disputes over pay differentials among skill groups 3.32 4.48 3.26 
Holiday Pay  1.97 - 2.27 
Shift/Night Rates 0.11 0.5 0.06 
Overtime 0.09  0.09 
Misc. Pay-related 1.6 5.72 1.32 
 
 
 
Table 1b Causes of Non-Pay Strikes, 1920 – 1970 
 
NON-PAY ISSUES 1920-1970 1920-1938 1946-1970 
  Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Wrongful dismissal 14.13 14.1 13.79 
Union-related issues (e.g. employment of non-union workers, inter-union disputes) 10.46 20.51 9.46 
Treatment of worker(s) 9.63 2.24 9.75 
Work Environment (e.g. work conditions too cold or too hot) 8.27 0.96 8.89 
Work flexibility (e.g. switching labour to alternative tasks, cover for absenteeism, work reorganisation) 7.41 0.64 8.29 
Job demarcation 7.06 21.79 6.17 
Working hours 5.87 3.85 6.19 
Redundancy 5.61 1.28 6.01 
Timing of job tasks (e.g. timing of piecework; objections to work time investigations) 4.95 6.41 4.92 
Sympathy with others (largely sympathy with workers directly involved in strikes/disputes) 4.75 9.62 4.48 
Supervision (e.g. objection to attitude of foreman)  4.38 3.21 4.16 
Delay in/ refusal of management to open negotiations   3.56 -  4 
Production constraints (e.g. shortage of work, partial plant shutdown, manning problems) 3.47 2.56 3.56 
Attendance at union meeting  (e.g. attendance at an unofficial meeting during working hours) 2.46 - 2.8 
Use of outside labour 0.81 2.24 0.75 
Apprentices  (e.g. ratios of apprentices to skilled journeymen) 0.42 4.17 0.15 
Miscellaneous 6.73 6.41 6.61 
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Table 2: Mean and median strike durations (days) by period and north/south 
 
   Issue 
 
 
Wages 
Only 
All Pay  
 
Non-Pay 
 
All Issues 
 
Pre-war Mean 60.03 43.51 9.33 28.41 
  Median 23 13 4 6 
  
No. of 
strikes 237 383 303 686 
War Mean 6.36 5.02 4.86 4.94 
  Median 2.5 2.5 2 2 
  
No. of 
strikes 110 333 360 693 
Post-war Mean 8.23 6.71 4.49 5.58 
 Median 3 2 1.5 2 
 No. of 
strikes 2311 4626 4776 9402 
 
   Issue 
 
 
Wage 
Only Wages Plus Nonwage All Issues 
North Mean 20.83 15.12 7.63 11.58 
  Median 5 4 3 3.5 
  
No. of 
strikes 1,095 2,080 1,869 3,949 
South Mean 7.13 5.50 3.30 4.35 
 Median 2 2 1 1 
 No. of 
strikes 1,563 3,262 3,570 6,832 
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Table 3: Description of Strike Activity (1920 – 1970) 
  Survival rates 
  
No. of 
strikes 
Mean 
Duration 
Median 
Duration Day5 Day25 Day50 Day75 Day100 
1920 175 58.3 10 0.7 0.33 0.27 0.26 0.23 
1921 103 37.61 11 0.68 0.41 0.34 0.21 0.12 
1922 33 27.7 20 0.79 0.42 0.21 0.12 0 
1923 21 27.48 19 0.71 0.33 0.24 0.05 0.05 
1924 33 22.09 8 0.64 0.27 0.09 0.09 0 
1925 27 19.81 16 0.78 0.48 0.07 0 0 
1926 7 33.29 2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.14 0.14 
1927 8 4.13 4 0.25 0 0 0 0 
1928 4 3 2.5 0.25 0 0 0 0 
1929 8 3.69 2.5 0.25 0 0 0 0 
1930 15 16.73 6 0.6 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.07 
1931 18 7.28 3 0.33 0.11 0 0 0 
1932 16 36.69 29 0.81 0.56 0.38 0.19 0 
1933 14 11.03 6.25 0.64 0.07 0.07 0 0 
1934 23 8.18 3 0.35 0.09 0.04 0 0 
1935 20 7.18 4 0.45 0.05 0 0 0 
1936 45 6.96 3 0.36 0.09 0 0 0 
1937 64 4.07 3 0.28 0.02 0 0 0 
1938 53 6.14 2 0.3 0.04 0.02 0 0 
1939 83 6.78 3 0.39 0.06 0.01 0 0 
1940 59 6.33 3 0.34 0.05 0 0 0 
1941 86 4.74 2 0.27 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 
1942 94 4.18 2 0.23 0.02 0 0 0 
1943 139 3.48 2 0.19 0.02 0 0 0 
1944 113 4.77 2 0.28 0.03 0 0 0 
1945 127 5.46 3 0.39 0.02 0 0 0 
1946 135 6.73 3 0.36 0.07 0.01 0 0 
1947 67 6.24 2 0.37 0.04 0 0 0 
1948 66 5.52 2.25 0.32 0.02 0 0 0 
1949 80 6.64 3.5 0.39 0.05 0 0 0 
1950 93 5.08 2 0.27 0.04 0 0 0 
1951 115 5.91 2 0.36 0.07 0 0 0 
1952 94 6.65 2 0.3 0.11 0 0 0 
1953 77 12.76 2.5 0.39 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.04 
1954 120 9.4 1.5 0.33 0.14 0.05 0.01 0 
1955 172 4.7 1 0.26 0.03 0 0 0 
1956 179 6.94 1.5 0.25 0.07 0.02 0.02 0 
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1957 189 5.31 1 0.22 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 
1958 225 6.85 2 0.3 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 
1959 219 7.04 2.5 0.33 0.07 0.03 0 0 
1960 240 8.31 4 0.45 0.11 0.01 0.01 0 
1961 222 9.55 5 0.55 0.09 0.02 0.01 0 
1962 225 9.83 4 0.49 0.1 0.03 0.01 0 
1963 220 8.06 3.25 0.41 0.1 0.02 0.01 0 
1964 251 8.26 4 0.44 0.09 0.03 0 0 
1965 585 4.82 2 0.26 0.04 0.01 0 0 
1966 744 3.83 1.5 0.18 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 
1967 942 4.86 1.5 0.21 0.04 0.01 0.01 0 
1968 1054 5.01 1.5 0.26 0.03 0.01 0 0 
1969 1452 4.01 1 0.2 0.03 0.01 0 0 
1970 1678 5.26 1.5 0.26 0.05 0.01 0 0 
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Table 4  Number of unions participating in strikes, 1920 – 1970 
 
Number of Unions 
 per Strike 
Total Number 
 
Percentage of Total 
1 7102 66.9 
2 1823 17.2 
3 1169 11.0 
4 288 2.7 
5 119 1.1 
6 51 0.5 
7 or more 56 0.5 
Mean number of unions per strike = 1.58 
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Table 5: Strike incidence and the business cycle: annual national unemployment rates, 1920 – 1970 
 
 1920 – 1970 
 
1920 – 1938 1946 – 1970 
 P N-P  P N-P  P N-P  
Companies -0.051* -0.024  -0.028 -0.017  -0.094 -0.047  
(see equation (1)) (0.023) (0.019) 
 
 (0.019) (0.025)  (0.126) (0.105)  
Note: * indicates significant at 5% on two-tail-test. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6 Strike durations and the business cycle, 1920 – 1970                  (Annual national unemployment rates) 
 
All years (1920 – 1970) Pre-war (1920 – 1938) Post-war (1946 – 1970) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation 
Method 
P N-P P  N-P P  N-P 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
-0.016 
(0.019) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.022) 
-0.034 
(0.021) 
 
0.051 
(0.028) 
0.329* 
(0.159) 
0.197 
 (0.160) 
Union Fixed 
Effects 
0.043** 
(0.016) 
0.014 
(0.018) 
 
0.087** 
(0.014) 
0.029 
(0.028) 
 
0.287 
(0.165) 
0.191 
(0.140) 
Company Fixed 
Effects 
-0.034 
(0.019) 
 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
-0.057 
(0.038) 
 
-0.013 
(0.037) 
0.299* 
(0.125) 
0.182 
(0.123) 
Union and 
Company Fixed 
Effects 
0.035 
(0.023) 
-0.0006 
(0.014) 
0.087 
(0.049) 
-0.078 
(0.041) 
0.234** 
(0.088) 
0.067 
(0.136) 
Sample sizes 
(number of 
clusters)     
 
5274 
(51) 
5334 
(51) 
360 
(19) 
296 
(19) 
4583 
(25) 
4678 
(25) 
Union groups 
(company 
groups) 
 
119 
(1297) 
107 
(1241) 
56 
(274) 
55 
(182) 
83 
(1023) 
77 
(1053) 
Mean duration 
(days) 
 
9.2 4.8 46.3 9.5 6.6 4.5 
Notes: Annual unemployment rates taken from Denham and McDonald (1996).All regressions include a quadratic time trend.   Robust 
standard errors allow for clustering by year. ** (*) denotes two-tail significance at 0.01 (0.05) level. 
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Table 7 Strike durations and the business cycle, 1960-1970 
                (Monthly district unemployment rates) 
 
Unemployment coefficients [Dependent Variable: log duration] 
 
 P  N-P 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
0.046 0.065* (a)  (year dummies) 
(0.048) (0.032) 
   
0.089* 0.089** (b)  (quadratic time trend) 
(0.045) 
 
(0.027) 
UNION FIXED EFFECTS 
0.044 0.068* (a)  (year dummies) 
(0.047) (0.030) 
   
(b)  (quadratic time trend) 0.082* 0.090** 
 (0.040) (0.026) 
   
COMPANY FIXED EFFECTS 
0.033 0.047 (a)  (year dummies) 
(0.048) (0.027) 
   
0.047 0.055* (b)  (quadratic time trend) 
(0.039) (0.023) 
   
UNION and COMPANY FIXED EFFECTS 
(a)  (year dummies) 0.014 0.073** 
 (0.054) (0.027) 
   
(b)  (quadratic time trend) 0.020 0.063** 
 (0.042) (0.024) 
   
Sample sizes (number of clusters) 
 
3673 (987) 3461 (942) 
Union groups (company groups) 
 
69 (864) 61 (763) 
Mean duration (days) 
 
6.6 4 
 
Notes: The data cover 11 years by 12 months by 54 districts. All regressions include 
district and month dummies. Robust standard errors allow for clustering at the 
year/month/district level.  ** (*) denotes two-tail significance at 0.01 (0.05) level.  
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Table 8  Successful strike outcomes (from the union standpoint) and the business cycle: pre- and post-war periods  (National 
annual unemployment rates) 
 
Pre-war (1920 – 1938) Post-war (1946 – 1970) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation Method 
P  N-P P  N-P 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
-0.032** 
(0.004) 
-0.020* 
(0.009) 
 
-0.019 
(0.049) 
-0.080 
(0.050) 
Union Fixed Effects -0.026** 
(0.007) 
 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.035 
(0.051) 
-0.067 
(0.044) 
Company Fixed Effects -0.042** 
(0.009) 
 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.029 
(0.041) 
-0.051* 
(0.026) 
 
Union & Company 
Fixed Effects 
-0.028* 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.061 
(0.037) 
-0.062* 
(0.029) 
Sample sizes (number 
of clusters)     
 
360 
(19) 
296 
(19) 
4583 
(25) 
4678 
(25) 
Union groups 
(company groups) 
 
56 
(274) 
55 
(182) 
83 
(1023) 
77 
(1053) 
Mean duration (days) 
 
46.3 9.5 6.6 4.5 
Notes: Annual unemployment rates taken from Denham and McDonald (1996).All regressions include a quadratic time trend.   Robust 
standard errors allow for clustering by year. ** (*) denotes two-tail significance at 0.01 (0.05) level. 
Appendix Table 4 gives the breakdown between successful strike outcomes and unsuccessful ones.
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Appendix Table 1: Local Unemployment Districts used in 1960-1970 regressions 
 
1 Aberdeen 28 Leicester 
2 Barrow 29 Lincoln 
3 Bedfordshire 30 Liverpool 
4 Belfast Marine 31 London 
5 Birkenhead 32 Manchester 
6 Birmingham 33 Mid Anglian 
7 Blackburn 34 North East Coast 
8 Bolton 35 Northern Ireland 
9 Border Counties 36 North Staffordshire 
10 Bradford 37 North West Scotland 
11 Burnley 38 Northern Counties 
12 Burton 39 Nottinghm 
13 Chester 40 Oldham 
14 Coventry 41 Outer London 
15 Derby 42 Peterborough 
16 Dundee 43 Preston 
17 East Anglia 44 Rochdale 
18 East Midlands 45 South Wales 
19 East Scotland 46 Scottish 
20 Grimsby 47 Sheffield 
21 Halifax 48 Shropshire 
22 Huddersfield 49 South Eastern 
23 Hull 50 St Helens 
24 Keighley 51 West of England 
25 Kilmarnock 52 Wakefield 
26 Lancashire 53 West Midlands 
27 Leeds 54 Wigan 
Source: Ministry of Labour Gazette (various issues), ‘Numbers Unemployed in Principal 
Towns and Development Areas’, London (HMSO). 
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Appendix Table 2  Stoppages of work in the Metal, Engineering and Shipbuilding 
Industries,  1914-1945 
  
Year Number of strikes* Number of workers 
directly and indirectly 
involved* (000) 
Number of working 
days lost** 
(000) 
1914 232 51 1308 
1915 189 46 357 
1916 105 75 305 
1917 225 429 3063 
1918 420 242 1499 
1919 335 403 12284 
1920 340 183 3414 
1921 151 63 4420 
1922 115 369 17484 
1923 103 61 5997 
1924 136 71 1400 
1925 94 24 184 
1926 62 14 221 
1927 69 16 81 
1928 51 8 60 
1929 80 39 768 
1930 70 10 92 
1931 61 12 99 
1932 46 4 48 
1933 68 15 112 
1934 81 15 160 
1935 73 17 93 
1936 148 47 206 
1937 220 107 778 
1938 138 44 243 
1939 181 56 332 
1940 229 40 163 
1941 472 154 556 
1942 476 141 526 
1943 612 170 635 
1944 610 194 1048 
1945 591 123 528 
Source: Knowles (1952, p. 308). 
*    Relates to strikes beginning in year 
**  Relates to strikes in progress during year 
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Appendix Table 3  Strike frequency by union 
 
No. of 
Strikes Freq. Percent Cum.% 
No. of 
Strikes Freq. Percent Cum.% 
1 43 29.25 29.25 40 1 0.68 81.63 
2 23 15.65 44.90 42 1 0.68 82.31 
3 6 4.08 48.98 51 1 0.68 82.99 
4 4 2.72 51.70 56 1 0.68 83.67 
5 5 3.40 55.10 59 1 0.68 84.35 
6 3 2.04 57.14 71 1 0.68 85.03 
7 1 0.68 57.82 80 1 0.68 85.71 
8 2 1.36 59.18 84 2 1.36 87.07 
9 3 2.04 61.22 85 1 0.68 87.76 
10 3 2.04 63.27 96 1 0.68 88.44 
11 5 3.40 66.67 97 1 0.68 89.12 
12 1 0.68 67.35 104 2 1.36 90.48 
13 2 1.36 68.71 132 1 0.68 91.16 
14 2 1.36 70.07 209 1 0.68 91.84 
16 1 0.68 70.75 213 1 0.68 92.52 
17 2 1.36 72.11 235 1 0.68 93.20 
19 1 0.68 72.79 243 1 0.68 93.88 
20 2 1.36 74.15 252 1 0.68 94.56 
23 2 1.36 75.51 313 1 0.68 95.24 
24 2 1.36 76.87 390 1 0.68 95.92 
25 1 0.68 77.55 416 1 0.68 96.60 
28 1 0.68 78.23 824 1 0.68 97.28 
30 1 0.68 78.91 1107 1 0.68 97.96 
31 1 0.68 79.59 1198 1 0.68 98.64 
33 1 0.68 80.27 1482 1 0.68 99.32 
39 1 0.68 80.95 1785 1 0.68 100.00 
    Total 147     
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Appendix Table 4 
 
Classification of strike outcomes 
 
Unsuccessful Successful 
Work resumed unconditionally Discussions/Investigations opened 
Work resumed. Discussions resumed. Matter resolved pending discussions 
Strike continued into following year Partial concessions made 
Workers dismissed Full demands met 
Workers voluntarily left company Work resumed 
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous 
 
 
 
 
